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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE. 
This case was a wrongful death action brought against Blaine County School District and 
Sergio Lopez-Rodriquez (hereinafter, "Lopez") by Dennis and Maryann Hennifer (hereinafter, 
"the Hennifers"), individually and as parents of Austin Hennefer, deceased. It arises from an 
October 26, 2010, motor vehicle accident between a vehicle driven by Lopez and a driver's 
education vehicle driven by Austin Hennefer. The driver's education course was conducted by 
the Blaine County School District #61 (hereinafter, "School District" or "District"). 
B. COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW. 
The Complaint was filed on September 21, 2011, against the School District, Jeffrey A. 
Mecham (the driver's education instructor), 1 and Sergio Lopez-Rodriquez ("Lopez"). 
On January 11, 2013, the District filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
concerning whether Mecham had acted recklessly or willfully, which was heard on February 13, 
2013. The District Court issued an oral decision denying the Motion. 
The District filed its Motion in Limine to Exclude Testimony by Plaintiffs' Expert Joellen 
Gill on March 25, 2013. The Motion was denied at a hearing on April 8, 2013. 
The jury trial began April 23, 2013. A verdict was rendered on May 1, 2013, and the 
Judgment was entered on May 8, 2013. In its Special Verdict, the jury assigned 100% of the fault 
to Jeffrey Mecham, and none to Lopez or Austin Hennefer. The jury also found that Jeffrey 
1 Mecham was dismissed from the case with prejudice on February 13, 2013. 
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Mecham had acted "willful" or "reckless," and awarded $7,473.40 in economic damages and a 
total of $3,500,000 in non-economic damages. 
The Plaintiffs moved for costs and fees on May 14, 2013. On May 22, 2013, the District 
timely filed its Motions for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict as to the Jury's Finding of 
Recklessness and for New Trial. The hearing on the two motions was July 15, 2013, with the 
Court denying the Plaintiffs' motion for fees, and the District's motion for JNOV. A written 
Order denying JNOV and an Amended Judgment were filed July 19, 2013. A written Order 
denying the Plaintiffs' request for attorney's fees was filed July 25, 2013. A Second Amended 
Judgment was filed on August 27, 2013. 
C. STATEMENT OF FACTS. 
The subject motor vehicle accident occurred on October 26, 2010, near milepost 176 on 
Highway 20, west of the junction with Highway 75, at approximately 7:30 a.m., when Lopez's 
vehicle collided with an automobile (hereinafter, "the auto") driven by Austin Hennefer. Tr. 
396, LI. 23-25; R. 17; Tr. 466. Jeffrey Mecham, the driver's education instructor, was in the 
front passenger seat. Jennifer Mares, another student, was in the rear seat of the auto. Tr. 468. 
Raul Ornelas and Curtis Miller witnessed the accident scene shortly after the collision. 
Raul Ornelas was a patrol officer for the Hailey City Police. Tr. 351, LI. 11-12. He encountered 
the accident scene while driving into work. See Tr. 352-353. Officer Curtis Miller was the 
officer that investigated the accident. See Tr. 395-96. 
Conditions reported by the witnesses varied according to the time and location. When 
Mr. Hennefer left for work at 6 a.m., there were "a little bit" of snow flurries, but no 
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accumulation of snow on the roads into Carey. Tr. 306, LI. 4-6. Mrs. Hennefer drove to Carey 
twice that morning. When she dropped Austin off for the driver's education class, the roads were 
wet, but there was no accumulation of snow on the road. Tr. 765, LI. 8-15. When she returned to 
Cary an hour later, at 8:00 a.m., all of the snow had melted. Tr. 765, L. 21-Tr. 766, L. 2. 
Officer Ornelas encountered the accident scene while driving to work. He approached the 
junction from the west-he lives a few miles east of Fairfield on Highway 20. Tr. 353, LI. 13-
14. He described the road as covered with packed snow and very slick all of the way to the 
accident scene. Tr. 353, LI. 17-25. He was only driving between 30 and 35 mph because of the 
conditions. Id. It was slicker than he expected at the accident scene. Tr. 357, LI. 21-23. It was 
overcast, and still dark. Tr. 355, LI. 13-24. He denied seeing any fog. Tr. 385, LI. 7-9. 
Officer Miller responded to a report of the accident, leaving Hailey and driving south on 
Highway 75. Tr. 397-98. It was very dark because of storm clouds over Hailey, but the clouds 
were not as heavy as he drove south. Tr. 398, LI 9-10. Road conditions worsened as he headed 
south, with the road turning from merely being wet to black ice to a measurable amount of ice on 
the roadway. Tr. 398, LI. 12-15. Near the accident scene, the road was covered by frozen snow 
or slush, and Miller could feel the roughness driving over it. Tr. 399, LI. 4-11. He travelled at 50 
or 55 mph on Highway 20 and believed that it was safe. Tr. 399, LI. 22-25. 
Mares rode into Carey from her home on Highway 20 between Carey and Picabo. Tr. 
465. Driving into Carey, the roads appeared to be slick and it was foggy. Tr. 467, LI. 1-3. She 
arrived at the school in Carey at around 7 a.m. Tr. 467, LI. 13-15. As they left the school, 
heading toward the junction, she described the roads still as looking slick, and that it was foggy 
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and cloudy. Tr. 475, LI. 2-4. The roads remained the same through Picabo. Tr. 476, LI. 6-14. 
Austin was driving 50 or 55 as they left Carey, but Mares thought it was safe. Tr. 475, LI. 19-23. 
At the junction, Mares saw only a few cars. Tr. 478, L. 20 - Tr. 479, L. 5. Mares could see the 
lights of cars coming down off Timmerman Hill, toward Bellevue. Tr. 479, LI. 3-17. 
There was little or no traffic on Highway 20 near the time of the collision. Officer 
Ornelas testified that there was hardly any traffic on Highway 20, and he did not remember 
seeing anyone ahead ofhim or behind him. Tr. 354, LI. 3-7. Mares testimony also indicated that 
there were few vehicles on the road. Tr. 478, L. 20-Tr. 479, L. 5. 
There was somewhat inconsistent evidence concerning the events of the accident. 
According to Officer Ornelas, who questioned him at the scene, Lopez stated that he had seen the 
driver's education vehicle off the side of the road up ahead of him. Tr. 371, LI. 10-20. Lopez 
related that he had slowed down and moved toward the center of the road when the driver's 
education vehicle turned in front of him. Id. Lopez indicated that he had tried to stop, but was 
unable to do so. Id. 
Officer Miller agreed that the auto was sideways to Lopez's vehicle at the time of the 
collision. Tr. 405, LI. 13-22. He observed post-collision tire marks, but no tire marks indicating 
that Lopez had attempted to brake. See Tr. 405, LI. 13-22; Tr. 413, LI. 7-21. C.f Tr. 449, L. 15 
- Tr. 450, L. 2. Officer Miller concluded that the auto was in the process of finishing a three-
point tum when the collision occurred. Tr. 417, LI. 20-25. I.e., Austin had already pulled into the 
road, backed up, then started to pull forward again, prior to the collision. Tr. 460, LI. 10-15. 
Mares had initially told the police that Austin was making a U-tum at the time of the 
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collision. Tr. 441, LI. 6-9. But at trial, she said that, after crossing the junction of Highways 75 
and 20: 
... we drove for another little while going west, and Mr.-after a while Mecham 
said up ahead you're going to pull over and you're going to do a three-point tum 
and then we're going to switch drivers. 
Tr. 480, LI. 20-24. Austin subsequently pulled off to the side of the road, with two wheels on the 
shoulder. Tr. 481, LI. 17-23. "And he was there for a while, and then, like, I don't know, I guess 
he decided to do the tum. They started doing the tum." Tr. 481, L. 24 - Tr. 482, L. 1. Austin 
went through the process of performing a 3-point tum, and then as he started forward a second 
time, she looked up and saw Lopez's vehicle approximately 40 feet away. Tr. 482, LI. 11-24. 
She did not remember anything being said prior to the impact. Tr. 482, L. 25 - Tr. 483, L. 2. 
Mares confirmed that they had studied 3-point turns in class. Tr. 500, L. 15 - Tr. 501, L. 19. 
Other locations to make a tum were not available. Mr. Hennefer examined the road near 
the accident scene for places to tum around, noting a turnout in front of gravel pit and a rest area 
at or near the junction. Tr. 338, L. 14-Tr. 339, L. 21. However, Officer Miller's dash cam was 
operating while he traveled to the scene of the accident, and showed equipment for loading sand 
at the location of the "gravel yard"-used for loading sand into highway sanding trucks.2 Tr. 
435, LI. 4-24. The video also shows that the entrance to a rest area near the junction was blocked 
off by orange barrels. Tr. 437, LI. 2-16. Mr. Hennefer was unable to identify other locations that 
2 This is consistent with later testimony that Mares had told one of her teachers, Jodi Olsen, that they had 
planned on turning in the gravel turnout, but there was a truck parked there; and the rest stop was closed, 
so they could not turn there. Tr. 797, LI. 1-18. 
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would have been visible to Mecham. Tr. 340, LI. 1-14. 
The testimony is clear that Austin had substantial driving experience for his age. He had 
driven a motorcycle, 4-wheeler, and/or small pickup around on his parents' farm for at least two 
years, every day. Tr. 302, L. 15 - Tr. 303, L. 4; Tr. 321, LI. 12-24; Tr. 344, LI. 17 - Tr. 345, 
L. 1. Austin had purchased a motorcycle two or three years prior to his death, which he used a 
lot. Tr. 752, LI. 15-19; Tr. 753, L. 23 - Tr. 754, L. 5. He also had driven tractors. Tr. 345, LI. 
12-15. Mr. Hennefer testified that Austin was very attentive when driving. Tr. 345, LI. 3-11. 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
A. Did the District Court err by not granting Defendant Blaine County School District #61 
and Jeffrey Mecham's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment? 
B. Did the District Court err by not granting Defendant Blaine County School District #61 's 
Motion for Directed Verdict? 
C. Did the District Court err in its instruction of the jury? 
D. Was the jury's verdict supported by substantial and competent evidence? 
E. Was the jury's verdict excessive and a product of passion and/or prejudice? 
F. Did the District Court err by not granting Defendant Blaine County School District #61 's 
Motions for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict and for New Trial? 
G. Did the jury and/or the Court improperly award or allow damages that were punitive in 
nature, and/or in excess of the amount allowed under law? 
H. Did the District Court err in overruling Defendant Blaine County School District #61 's 
objection and motion to exclude the testimony of Plaintiffs' expert Joellen Gill during 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 6 
trial as improper expert testimony and/or as a rebuttal witness? 
III. ARGUMENT 
A. THE CORRECT ST AND ARD FOR RECKLESSNESS. 
This Court has previously interpreted "reckless disregard" or "reckless conduct." See 
Hodge v. Borden, 91 Idaho 125,417 P.2d 75 (1966); Peterson v. Parry, 92 Idaho 647,448 P.2d 
653 (1968); Hayslip v. George, 92 Idaho 349, 442 P.2d 759 (1968). "[G]ross negligence is not 
synonymous with willful or wanton misconduct" and there is a "distinction between gross 
negligence and 'reckless disregard."' S. Griffin Const., Inc. v. City of Lewiston, 135 Idaho 181, 
189, 16 P .3d 278, 286 (2000). 
The issue arose in Hodge, Peterson and Hayslip because the Idaho legislature had 
changed the requirement for liability under Idaho's automobile guest statute from "reckless 
disregard of the rights of others," to "gross negligence." Hodge, 91 Idaho at 133. The court held 
that: 
'Reckless disregard of the rights of others' could be regarded as the type of 
conduct engaged in by the driver when he actually perceives the danger and 
continues his course of conduct. Gross negligence could then be considered as 
describing conduct of the driver when he does an act not knowing of the high 
degree of manifest danger but under the circumstances where he should have 
known. 
Hodge, 91 Idaho at 134 (quoting Williamson v. McKenna, 354 P.2d 56 (Ore. 1960)). The court 
further noted that: 
Reckless disregard includes gross negligence just as the greater includes the 
lesser. Gross negligence, however, need not include willfulness, or wanton or 
intentional disregard for the guest's safety, or conscious indifference to 
consequences; and there need not be an actual intent to inflict damage or injury. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF- 7 
Hodge, 91 Idaho at 134-35. Accord, Hayslip, 92 Idaho at 353-54. In other words, reckless 
conduct requires a higher degree of culpability than gross negligence. Peterson, 92 Idaho at 657. 
Recklessness, "requires proof of an absence of heed or concern for consequences, a heedlessness 
of danger, a 'wanton disregard, or conscious indifference to consequences."' Hodge, 91 Idaho at 
134. "This implies a consciousness of danger and a willingness to assume the risk, or an 
indifference to consequences." Id. (underline added). 
Idaho still distinguishes between "recklessness" and "gross negligence." Under the Idaho 
Tort Claims Act (ITCA) "recklessness" requires an actor to "intentionally and knowingly" do, or 
fail to do, an act; while "gross negligence" only requires deliberate indifference. I.C. § 6-904C. 
The Court explained the requirements for showing reckless conduct under Idaho Code § 6-904C 
in Harris v. State, Dept. of Health & Welfare, 123 Idaho 295, 847 P.2d 1156 (1992), and 
Hunter v. State, Dept. of Corrections, 138 Idaho 44, 57 P.3d 755 (2002). In both cases, the 
Court noted that the key element was knowledge; and that the phrase "having a reason to know" 
implied an element of foreseeability. Hunter, 138 Idaho at 49; Harris 123 Idaho at 299. 
However, this foreseeability requires more than the mere possibility of the harm, but that the 
specific harm must be manifest or ostensible, and highly likely to occur. Id. 
In S. Griffin Const., Inc. v. City of Lewiston, supra, 135 Idaho 181, 16 P.3d 278 (2000), 
the court considered what constituted "gross negligence" under the Disaster Preparedness Act. 
That Act "provides immunity for the state and its agencies, as well as for businesses working 
under contract for the state in disaster relief efforts, except in cases of gross negligence or willful 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF- 8 
misconduct." S. Griffin Const., 135 Idaho at 189 (citing LC. § 46-1017). To determine the 
meaning of "gross negligence," the court looked to its earlier decisions regarding the automobile 
guest statute and the ITCA. See Id. The court observed that "[g]ross negligence could then be 
considered as describing conduct of the driver when he does an act not knowing of the high 
degree of manifest danger but under circumstances where he should have known." Id. (quoting 
Hayslip, supra, 92 Idaho at 353). The court also considered the definition of gross negligence 
under the ITCA (then at LC. § 6-904B). 
Five years later, the Court considered the meaning of reckless disregard in the context of 
Idaho Code § 49-623. Athay v. Stacey, 142 Idaho 360, 128 P.3d 897 (2005) (Athay I). Section 
49-623 provided certain exemptions to traffic laws for the drivers of authorized emergency 
vehicles. But the immunities did not "protect the driver from the consequences of his reckless 
disregard for the safety of others." Athay I, 142 Idaho at 364 (quoting LC. § 49-623). In 
interpreting "reckless disregard," the Court looked to both the definition of recklessness under 
the ITCA (i.e., LC. § 6-904C) and its holding in Hodge v. Borden, supra. See Athay I, 142 Idaho 
at 364. The Court again observed: 
" 'Reckless disregard of the rights of others' could be regarded as the type of 
conduct engaged in by the driver when he actually perceives the danger and 
continues his course of conduct." We distinguished reckless disregard from gross 
negligence in that the latter would apply where the driver does not know of the 
high degree of manifest danger, but should have known. 
Athay I, 142 Idaho at 364. Thus, "[t]o constitute reckless disregard, the actor's conduct must not 
only create an unreasonable risk of bodily harm, but ... the actor must actually perceive the high 
degree of probability that harm will result and continue in his course of conduct." Athay v. 
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Stacey, 146 Idaho 407,414, 196 P.3d 325,332 (2008) (Athay II) (citations omitted). 
In Carrillo v. Boise Tire Co., 152 Idaho 741, 274 P.3d 1256 (2012), the court held for, 
under Idaho Code§ 6-1603, "willful or reckless misconduct is a form of negligence that involves 
both intentional conduct and knowledge of a substantial risk of harm." Carrillo, 152 Idaho at 
751. 
Reckless misconduct differs from negligence in several important particulars. It 
differs from that form of negligence which consists in mere inadvertence, 
incompetence, unskillfulness or a failure to take precautions to enable the actor 
adequately to cope with a possible or probable future emergency in that reckless 
misconduct requires a conscious choice of a course of action either with 
knowledge of the serious danger to others involved in it or with knowledge of 
facts which would disclose this danger to any reasonable man. It differs not only 
from the above-mentioned form of negligence, but also from that negligence 
which consists in intentionally doing an act with knowledge that it contains a risk 
of harm to others, in that the actor to be reckless must recognize that his conduct 
involves a risk substantially greater in amount than that which is necessary to 
make his conduct negligent. 
Id. (quoting State v. Papse, 83 Idaho 358, 362-63, 362 P.2d 1083, 1086 (1961)) (underline 
added). 
Papse, supra, involved an automobile collision, where the defendant struck another 
vehicle after the defendant ran a stop sign. The defendant was found to have acted with reckless 
disregard. In defining reckless disregard, the court relied on the Restatement of the Law of Torts, 
§ 500, and certain of the comments. Specifically: 
'a. Unreasonableness of risk. In order that the actor's conduct may be in reckless 
disregard of the bodily security of others, it must not only involve a high degree 
of probability that death or serious bodily harm will result therefrom, but the 
circumstances must be such that the risk so created is unreasonable.' At page 
1293. 
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'b. Perception of risk. Conduct cannot be in reckless disregard of the safety of 
others unless the act or breach of duty is itself intended, notwithstanding that the 
actor knows of facts which would lead any reasonable man to realize the extreme 
risk to which it subjects the safety of others. It is reckless for a driver of an 
automobile intentionally to cross a through highway in defiance of a stop sign if a 
stream of vehicles is seen to be closely approaching in both directions, but if his 
failure to stop is due to the fact that he has permitted his attention to be diverted 
so that he does not know that he is approaching the crossing, he may be merely 
negligent and not reckless.' At page 1294. 
'g. Negligence and recklessness contrasted. Reckless misconduct differs from 
negligence in several important particulars. It differs from that form of negligence 
which consists in mere inadvertence, incompetence, unskillfulness or a failure to 
take precautions to enable the actor adequately to cope with a possible or probable 
future emergency in that reckless misconduct requires a conscious choice of a 
course of action either with knowledge of the serious danger to others involved in 
it or with knowledge of facts which would disclose this danger to any reasonable 
man. It differs not only from the above-mentioned form of negligence, but also 
from that negligence which consists in intentionally doing an act with knowledge 
that it contains a risk of harm to others, in that the actor to be reckless must 
recognize that his conduct involves a risk substantially greater in amount than that 
which is necessary to make his conduct negligent. The difference between 
reckless misconduct and conduct involving only such a quantum of risk as is 
necessary to make it negligent is a difference in degree of the risk, but this 
difference of degree is so marked as to amount substantially to a difference in 
kind.' At pages 1296-97. 
Papse, 83 Idaho at 362-63 (quoting Restatement of the Law of Torts, § 500, comments a, band 
c). It is notable that in the Papse case, not only did the driver run a stop sign, but: 
... the defendant knew he was approaching a through highway; that it was his 
duty to stop, make observation of the traffic thereon, and not to enter upon such 
highway until he could do so without endangering others traveling thereon; that 
he was aware of the obstructions to his view from a distance of 300 feet or more 
to the west until he reached the position of the stop sign; and that such facts and 
circumstances which were known to the defendant, or which the defendant had 
reason to know, would lead a reasonable man to realize that in driving onto 
Philbin road without stopping and observing the traffic thereon, not only would 
create an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to persons traveling on Philbin road, 
but also would involve a high degree of probability that substantial harm would 
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result to others by reason thereon. The evidence discloses 'a conscious choice of a 
course of action, either with knowledge of the serious danger to others involved in 
it, or with knowledge of facts which would disclose this danger to any reasonable 
man.' 2 Restatement of Torts,§ 500. 
State v. Papse, 83 Idaho at 363. 
Smith v. Sharp, 85 Idaho 17, 375 P.2d 184 (1962), was also a case where the court 
upheld a determination of recklessness in a motor vehicle collision. In that case, the court found 
recklessness where: 
[The defendant] drove his car away from the Carter-Hayes intersection at a speed 
which was greater than reasonable under the circumstances; that he deliberately 
turned off his lights and proceeded in the darkness on the wrong side of the 
roadway toward the lighted intersection; was driving at a speed which was 
excessive for town driving; he was warned by one of the passengers that danger 
lurked ahead; he hit the depressions causing the occupants to be thrown violently 
forward; he continued on down an unfamiliar street for a distance of 1 73 feet 
without applying his brakes, although he could have stopped safely within the 173 
feet; that he drove down a 45 degree embankment at such speed as to cause the 
automobile to flip over onto its top into the river just as the brakes were applied, 
all of which when taken together shows a deliberate course of conduct in reckless 
disregard of the rights of others and constituted the proximate cause of Marilee 
Smith's death. 
Smith, 85 Idaho at 32-33. 
Conversely, in Wilson v. Bacon, 78 Idaho 389, 304 P.2d 908 (1956), the court upheld 
dismissal of a suit under the guest statute. The complaint alleged that the defendant had run a 
stop sign even though another vehicle was clearly visible approaching the intersection, and that 
the defendant "wholly failed to maintain any lookout whatsoever at said intersection, ... without 
looking to the right or left .... " Wilson, 78 Idaho at 390-91. The court concluded that the facts 
pled would only establish negligence, not recklessness. Wilson, 78 Idaho at 391. 
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In Hunter v. Horton, 80 Idaho 475, 333 P.2d 459 (1958), the defendant had lost control 
of her vehicle while attempting to pass another vehicle on a tum, killing one of the passengers. 
Hunter, 80 Idaho at 4 77. The Court concluded that the facts did not establish recklessness, 
reasoning: 
There is nothing in the facts from which it can be inferred that Claire Horton was 
conscious of any danger in attempting to pass the Baker car, or that she was 
aware, or should have been aware, of the possibility that the left wheels might go 
over the left edge of the pavement and cause her to lose control. There is nothing 
to indicate a willingness on her part to assume the risk, or an indifference to the 
consequences thereof. Thus, the evidence before us lacks the essential elements of 
reckless disregard set forth in our previous decisions. 
Hunter, 80 Idaho at 486. 
The court also rejected a claim of recklessness in Turner v. Purdum, 77 Idaho 130, 289 
P.2d 608 (1955). There, the defendant collided with the rear of a tractor while driving at night. 
Turner, 77 Idaho at 135. Purdum saw a white light on the back of the tractor briefly when 
approximately a half-mile behind the tractor, and then did not see it again until within 25 or 30 
feet behind the tractor/digger, when it was too late to avoid the collision. Id. Plaintiff claimed 
that Purdum was reckless by driving at an excessive speed and without keeping a proper lookout 
ahead. Id. Upholding a directed verdict for the defendant, the Supreme Court observed: 
The evidence does not disclose that respondent Purdum was driving at a rate of 
speed which could constitute more than ordinary negligence under the 
circumstances. His failure to see the potato digger in time to avoid the accident 
could not be more than ordinary negligence. There is nothing in the record to 
indicate that respondent Purdum was or should have been conscious of danger and 
to indicate a willingness on his part to assume the risk, or an indifference to 
consequences. 
Turner, 77 Idaho at 138. 
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In other words, recklessness requires knowledge of the actual, manifest danger, coupled 
with an act or failure to act in disregard of that danger. In this case, to prove reckless misconduct, 
it was not enough for Plaintiffs to show that Mecham was aware the three-point tum was 
dangerous or that, under the conditions, more hazardous than typical. Rather, Plaintiffs had to 
show that Mecham knew that there was a high probability of a collision if the tum was attempted 
and, nevertheless, instructed Austin to proceed with making the tum. 
B. THE DISTRICT COURT SHOULD HA VE GRANTED APPELLANT'S MOTION 
FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
Idaho Code§ 6-1603(1) limits the noneconomic damages recoverable in a personal injury 
action. There is an exception for "[ c ]auses of action arising out of willful or reckless 
misconduct." I.C. § 6-1603(4)(a). The District filed a motion for partial summary judgment on 
the issue of recklessness. The District Court erroneously determined that there were issues of 
material fact and denied the motion. SR 1; Tr. 44. It is clear that court applied "negligence" or 
"gross negligence" rather than a "reckless" standard in deciding the summary judgment motion. 
Under the correct standard, the School District was entitled to summary judgment. 
1. Facts Presented at Summary Judgment. 
In its briefing, the District noted that it was early morning and still dark; and there was 
some snow on the ground, but the roads were not icy at Carey School where the driving lesson 
began. R. 126-127. When the auto left Carey School, Austin Hennefer was driving, Mecham was 
in the passenger seat, and another student, Jennifer Mares, was in the back seat. R. 128. Mecham 
had originally planned that the drive would take the students westward on Highway 20, past the 
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intersection of Highway 20 and Highway 75, to tum around in a graveled area just past the 
intersection-a drive of about one-half hour. R. 128. Although fog had reduced visibility to 
around 100 feet in Carey, it was less foggy once the vehicle passed the junction of the highways. 
R. 129. Once past the intersection, the road became icy. R. 129. There were only a handful of 
vehicles travelling on Highway 75, and no vehicles were observed on Highway 20. 
Austin drove past the planned tum around, but proceeded to approximately Milepost 
176-about a mile further. R. 129-130. There, he pulled the vehicle off to the side of the road, 
and-apparently at the instructions of Mecham-attempted a three-point tum. R. 130. Lopez 
was driving westbound on Highway 20-i.e., behind the auto-and testified he was travelling at 
approximately 50 mph at the time of impact. R. 130. He collided with the auto as it was 
completing the tum-i.e., the auto was almost completely in the eastbound lane. R. 130. 
Plaintiffs did not contest these basic facts. See R. 144-148. Plaintiffs noted that Officer 
Ornelas described it as dark and overcast. R. 148. Also, the roads were icy enough that 
Ornelas-even with studded snow tires-was only driving at 35-45 mph, and considered that 
excessive for the road conditions. R. 148-149. Plaintiffs submitted testimony from Jamie 
Maddux, an accident reconstructionist, confirming that the driver's education car was in the final 
stage of the 3-point tum, R. 218 (Maddux Depo. p. 32, LL 23-25), and indicating that Lopez may 
have been driving at or above 65 mph. R. 221 (Maddux Depo., p. 67, LL 1-5). 
There are no facts suggesting that Mecham saw Lopez's vehicle pnor to Austin 
beginning the tum, or even prior to the collision. Jennifer did not see the headlights from Lopez's 
vehicle until approximately 30 or 40 feet from the auto, immediately prior to the collision. R. 77 
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(Mares Depo. p. 57, LL 5-6). Because of Mecham's injuries, he had no memory of the collision 
or the events just before the collision. R. 53-54 (Mecham Depo., pp. 76-77 and 79-80). Austin 
Hennefer, who was driving the auto, is deceased and cannot testify on the issue. However, there 
is a presumption at law that Austin was exercising due care, "founded on the principle that a 
person will maintain the ordinary instincts for self-preservation[.]" Peterson, supra, 92 Idaho at 
652. Thus, it must be presumed that Austin did not see Lopez's lights before initiating the tum. 
Because Mecham is unable to recall the facts of the accident due to his injuries, the same 
presumption should be applied to Mecham. 
Although Plaintiffs cite Maddux's testimony for the proposition that Mecham could have 
seen the other vehicle's headlights prior to initiating the tum, Maddux full testimony showed that 
it depending on the timing. If the tum took longer than normal, the headlights would not have 
been visible because of a curve in the road. R. 223 (Maddux Depo., p. 75, L. 10 - p. 76, L. 18). 
Finally, Plaintiffs suggest that Mecham violated principles outlined in the "Drive Right" 
textbook by having the students perform a 3-point tum. See R. 144-145. Yet, the portion cited by 
Plaintiffs indicates that a 3-point tum can be used "on a rural roadway with no driveways"-the 
very type of location where Mecham and his students were driving. See R. 146. 
2. Legal Arguments at Summary Judgment. 
The School District argued a recklessness standard under LC. § 6-904C and Idaho case 
law requiring intentional and knowing conduct. R. 133 and 135. 
Although they did not term it as such, the Hennefers argued that the District Court should 
substitute a lesser, negligence or gross negligence standard. Plaintiffs argued that Mecham 
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"knew or should have known that practicing a three-point turn on Highway 20 was hazardous 
and was not an appropriate place for a three-point turn." R. 143 (underline added). See also R. 
154 (arguing that "[t]he failure to follow his own instructional material is reckless and boarders 
[sic] on intentional misconduct."). 
At the hearing on the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, the Hennefers contended 
that Mecham should have had a lesson plan and route plan, stating: "[I]f we get it to a jury and 
the jury concludes that this guy had no plan, that alone is evidence of recklessness. The failure to 
plan is a plan for failure." Tr. 16, L. 15-Tr. 17, L. 2. But they offered no case law suggesting 
that driving a vehicle without a driving plan is negligent, let alone reckless. 
Plaintiffs argued for adoption of a recklessness standard set out in a jury instruction 
quoted in Phillips v. Erhart, 151 Idaho 100, 254 P.3d 1 (2011). Tr. 19, LI. 10-21. The quoted 
instruction defined "willful or reckless misconduct" using "knew or should have known" 
language. Phillips, 151 Idaho at 107. However, the Phillips court did not adopt or rule on the 
correctness of the instruction, but specifically noted that "[t]here is no contention that this 
instruction is erroneous, so we will address the issue in light of it." Id. 
3. The District Court Applied the Incorrect Standard. 
The District Court recognized that two different standards were being advanced, 
including that "[ o ]ne says knew or should have known," but determined that it did not have to 
decide between the two standards. Tr. 38, LI. 19-22. Nevertheless, the District Court applied a 
negligence or gross negligence standard. The court reasoned: 
But we don't have to speculate here, in my view, as to what Mecham knew or 
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intended. We know-or I think his is responsible to know, and whether you call 
that knew or should have known, he knew the weather conditions around him. 
He's not blind. He knows what the weather is doing. He has to know the 
conditions of the road and the roadway. 
Tr. 41, Ll. 2-8. The Court expounded on the connection between the weather and whether it was 
appropriate to teach a 3-point tum: 
So, given those factors, the things that Mecham knows or is on notice of or knew 
or should have known or however you call this, he has to know the weather 
conditions, he has to know-and you could argue both ways on the three-point 
tum. Does he actually know in his mind that he can't or shouldn't make a three-
point tum under those circumstances or is that something that you can point to his 
instruction manual and say he should know what's in that manual, and if he 
doesn't follow it, he should know he's doing something wrong either way. If he 
knows he shouldn't do it in his head and he does it anyway, that's one form of 
negligence and/or recklessness. And if he doesn't know that he shouldn't do it, 
you could make the same argument, that that's another form of negligence or 
recklessness. 
Tr. 42, L. 13-43, L. 2 (underline added). The Court concluded that "the question comes down to 
was it reckless to instruct the Driver's Education driver to conduct a three-point tum at that time 
and place and under those weather conditions?" Tr. 43, LI. 17-21. The District Court did not 
consider the proximity, or lack thereof, of Lopez's vehicle or whether Mecham appreciated it, or 
the lack of traffic in general. Rather, the District Court held that making a 3-point tum in the 
early morning on icy roads (negligence, if even that) was, or could be, reckless in and of itself. 
This is clearly at odds with this Court's holding in Carrillo v. Boise Tire Co., 152 Idaho 741,274 
P.3d 1256 (2012), and the other cases where this Court has discussed reckless conduct. 
4. If the District Court Had Applied the Correct Standard, It Would Have Had 
to Grant Summary Judgment to the School District. 
If the District Court had applied the correct standard, it would have had to conclude there 
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were no facts to support a finding ofrecklessness, and grant the School District's motion. 
As this Court stated in Carrillo, "reckless misconduct requires a conscious choice of a 
course of action either with knowledge of the serious danger to others involved in it or with 
knowledge of facts which would disclose this danger to any reasonable man." Carrillo, 152 
Idaho at 751. This is not knowledge of a theoretical or possible danger, but an imminent danger. 
Recklessness "implies a consciousness of danger and a willingness to assume the risk, or an 
indifference to consequences." Hodge, 91 Idaho at 134. 
This is not a case where the weather caused the accident. Rather, the imminent danger 
was making a tum in front of Lopez's vehicle. But there is no evidence that anyone in the 
driver's education vehicle, including Mecham, knew of Lopez's vehicle prior to Austin initiating 
the turnabout. Mares testified that she did not see the lights until Lopez's vehicle was only 30 or 
40 feet away. Austin is deceased and Mecham did not remember the incident. It would have been 
pure speculation for the jury to determine that Mecham had knowledge of the imminent danger. 
In order to withstand a motion for summary judgment, the plaintiffs case must be anchored in 
something more solid than speculation. 1l1allonee v. State, 139 Idaho 615, 621, 84 P.3d 551, 557 
(2004); Antim v. Fred Meyer Stores, Inc., 150 Idaho 774, 251 P.3d 602 (Ct. App. 2011). 
Accordingly, the District Court should have granted summary judgment to the School District. 
C. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY NOT GRANTING THE MOTION FOR 
DIRECTED VERDICT. 
At the close of the Plaintiffs' case, the School District moved for a directed verdict on the 
issue ofrecklessness. See generally Tr. 767 - 781. The District Court again applied the incorrect 
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legal standard. 
The grant or denial of a directed verdict is reviewed de nova by the appellate court. Griff, 
Inc. v. Curry Bean Co., Inc., 138 Idaho 315,319, 63 P.3d 441,445 (2003). In deciding a motion 
for directed verdict, the court must determine whether, admitting the truth of the adverse 
evidence and drawing every legitimate inference most favorably to the opposing party, there 
exists substantial evidence to justify submitting the case to the jury. Sheridan v. St. Luke's 
Regional Medical Ctr., 135 Idaho 775, 784, 25 P.3d 88, 97 (2001). "The 'substantial evidence' 
test does not require the evidence be uncontradicted. It requires only that the evidence be of 
sufficient quantity and probative value that reasonable minds could conclude that a verdict in 
favor of the party against whom the motion is made is proper." Sheridan, 135 Idaho at 784-85 
(quoting All v. Smith's Management Corp., 109 Idaho 479,480, 708 P.2d 884, 885 (1985)). 
1. The District Court Failed to Apply the Correct Standard. 
Recklessness is "the type of conduct engaged in by the driver when he actually perceives 
the danger and continues his course of conduct." Athay I, 142 Idaho at 364. Thus, "the actor's 
conduct must not only create an unreasonable risk of bodily harm, but ... the actor must actually 
perceive the high degree of probability that harm will result and continue in his course of 
conduct." Athay II, 146 Idaho at 414. 
The School District conceded that there was probably sufficient evidence to establish 
negligence on the part of Mecham. Tr. 773, LI. 13-15. The School District referred the District 
Court to both the recklessness standard set out in the ITCA and the Hodge v. Borden decision. 
Tr. 774, L. 17 - Tr. 775, L. 11. Plaintiffs argued Mecham should not have instructed Austin to 
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make the tum where and when he did, and stated that Mecham "knew or should have known, 
which is the standard, that a car was coming." Tr. 777, LI. 10-11. See also Tr. 649, LI. 1-13 
(arguing that recklessness was an objective standard). This was the wrong standard. 
As before, the District Court believed it did not need to distinguish between the two 
standards advanced by the parties. Tr. 781, LI. 1-2. The District reasoned: 
The evidence of recklessness, to me, is that Mecham violated what he was taught. 
The evidence is that Austin was directed to do a three-point tum on an icy road, 
on a high speed two-lane highway in twilight conditions, and the driver's training 
instructions that he's given tell him that if you're going to execute a three-point 
tum, you do it on a dead-end street, you do it on a low speed road with no traffic. 
And, to me, that's the bottom line. 
Tr. 780, LI. 11-18. The District Court did not considered if the maneuver entailed a high 
probability of harm; or whether Mecham's actually perceived a high degree of probability of 
harm. Accordingly, the District Court failed to apply or discuss the applicable standard. 
2. There Were Not Substantial Facts to Support a Claim of Recklessness. 
Had the Court applied the correct standard, it would have been compelled to direct a 
verdict as to the claim of recklessness because there was a lack of sufficient evidence to support 
submitting the issue of recklessness to the jury. See Statement of Facts, supra. 
As an initial matter, making a 3-point tum is not illegal, and no facts or allegations were 
asserted stating that it was illegal to make the tum at the location of the collision. Thus, unlike 
some of the cases cited earlier, this case does not present a situation where there was a deliberate 
choice to violate the law. 
Although Brian Jones, who created the Idaho State curriculum, agreed that 3-point turns 
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are most dangerous or hazardous of the turns taught to students because the vehicle is stopped 
across a traffic lane, Tr. 626-277 and 643, he also testified that, per the State curriculum, driving 
instructors are required to teach 3-point turns to students. Tr. 671, LI. 2-6; Tr. 674, LI. 12-15. In 
other words, 3-point turns are not per se dangerous or hazardous. Rather, in ranking the types of 
turns taught to students, they are the most hazardous of those taught. 
The District Court believed that a 3-point tum should only be performed "on a low speed 
road with no traffic." Tr. 780, LI. 11-18. However, that is not what the testimony indicated. 
Jones used a book stating that "[a] three-point turnabout should rarely be used. Use this 
turnabout only when you are on a dead-end street or on a rural roadway with no driveways." Tr. 
626, L. 24 - Tr. 627, L. 2; Tr. 643, LI. 14-22. Nothing in the curriculum materials indicated that 
the tum should only be performed "on a low-speed road with no traffic." And, in fact, Mecham 
and his students were on a rural roadway with no driveways, with a rest area that was blocked off 
and closed, and a loading area for sand trucks that had equipment in it. Thus, the District Court 
misstated and misinterpreted the testimony and driving curriculum in denying the Motion for 
Directed Verdict. 
Plaintiffs argued that the driver's education training should not have been made because 
of the dark and the road conditions. However, Jones testified that classes could be held even if it 
was dark. Tr. 677, LI. 4-8. Thus, it was not unreasonable to drive pre-dawn or post-sundown. 
Tr. 677, L. 24 - Tr. 678, L. 1. In fact, Idaho's drivers education curriculum was not intended to 
only rely on parents to teach students how to drive at night. Tr. 677, LI. 20-23. Jones also 
testified it was not unreasonable to drive when the roads are slick or snow-covered, but it should 
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be viewed as an opportunity to practice. Tr. 678, LI. 3-14. Debbie Cottonware, a driver's 
education specialist retained by Plaintiffs, agreed that "[i]f snowy conditions are available for 
drive time, it's a valuable-it can be a valuable lesson, yes." Tr. 711, LI. 3-4. She thought it was 
appropriate that students get experience driving on slick or snowy roads. Tr. 711, LI. 15-18. 
Plaintiffs thought it significant that Mecham did not have highly developed route plans. 
However, Jones testified that the use of route plans was introduced as part of the State 
curriculum to improve the efficiency of the teaching. See generally Tr. 630-31. He stated: 
I think, historically, teachers just kind of wandered and drove the city streets, and 
if they got the chance to practice something, they did; if they didn't, they just 
went back to the school and called it a good drive. So this [i.e., introduction of 
route plans] was, again, an attempt to really improve the program. 
Tr. 631, LI. 4-9. Jones did not require route plans for safety reasons. 
Finally, there was no evidence that the conditions contributed to the accident. The 
evidence from Mares and Officer Ornelas indicated that there was very little traffic. Although it 
was dark, the testimony indicated that vehicles were using their headlights. Mares testified that 
Austin had his headlights on. Tr. 475, LI. 8-9. At the junction of Highways 20 and 75, Mares 
could, because of headlights, see vehicles as far away as Timmerman Hill. Tr. 479, LI. 3-12. 
Although the roads appeared to her to be slick, she was not uncomfortable with Austin driving. 
Tr. 475, L. 19 -Tr. 476, L. 1; Tr. 476, Ll. 21-22. In her testimony of the stop and tum executed 
by Austin, she makes no mention of Austin having difficulties in stopping or steering. See Tr. 
481-483. In other words, even drawing reasonable inferences in favor of the Plaintiffs, there was 
no evidence that the collision was because of heavy or continuous traffic, a lack of visibility, or 
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because Austin lacked sufficient traction. 
Rather, the evidence indicates that, for whatever reason, Austin, Mecham, and Mares 
simply did not see Lopez's vehicle. In other words, "[t]here is nothing in the record to indicate 
that [Mecham] was or should have been conscious of danger and to indicate a willingness on his 
part to assume the risk, or an indifference to consequences." Turner, 77 Idaho at 138. As this 
Court has made clear, the failure to keep an adequate lookout is not recklessness. Wilson, 78 
Idaho at 3 91 ; Turner, 77 Idaho at 13 8. 
D. THE COURT DID NOT CORRECTLY INSTRUCT THE JURY. 
The propriety of a jury instruction is a question of law over which the Court exercises 
free review. Mackay v. Four Rivers Packing Co., 151 Idaho 388, 391, 257 P.3d 755, 758 
(2011). The standard of review of whether a jury instruction should or should not have been 
given is whether there is evidence at trial to support the instruction, and whether the instruction 
is a correct statement oflaw. Id. 
1. The Instruction on Recklessness Was Incorrect. 
As discussed in more detail in Sections B, above, and D, below, there was insufficient 
evidence to support an instruction of recklessness. In addition, the District Court's instruction 
regarding recklessness was not a correct statement of the law. As noted earlier, recklessness 
requires knowledge and conscious disregard of a high degree of danger. See Carrillo v. Boise 
Tire Co., 152 Idaho 741, 751, 274 P.3d 1256, 1266 (2012); Hayslip v. George, 92 Idaho at 353. 
"[T]he actor must actually perceive the high degree of probability that harm will result and 
continue in his course of conduct." Athay II, 146 Idaho at 414. 
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At Instruction No. 20, the Court instructed the jury: 
The words "willful or reckless misconduct" when used in these instructions and 
when applied to the allegations in this case, mean more than ordinary negligence. 
The words mean intentional or reckless actions, taken under circumstances where 
the actor knew or should have known that the actions not only created an 
unreasonable risk of harm to another, but involved a high degree of probability 
that such harm would actually result. 
Supp. R. 218 (underline added). Under this instruction, the jury was not required to determine 
that Mecham knew of the danger, or knew of facts that would have disclosed the danger to a 
reasonable person. The jury could have found recklessness simply on determining that Mecham 
should have known of facts disclosing the danger prior to Austin initiating the tum. See State v. 
Blake, 133 Idaho 237,240,985 P.2d 117, 120 (1999) (holding that jury instruction incorporating 
"should have known" described a negligence standard). That is, mere negligence--i.e., Mecham 
should have been aware of the proximity of Lopez's vehicle-was enough to find "recklessness" 
per the instruction. This is, however, contrary to this Court's prior holdings that the failure to 
keep an adequate lookout is not, in and of itself, reckless. 
2. The Court Should Have Re-Ordered the Special Verdict. 
The District objected to the ordering of the Special Verdict Form that placed the question 
on willful or reckless conduct before the determination of the damage award. See Supp. R. 229 
(special verdict) and R. 390. The only purpose of the recklessness question was to guide the 
District Court on whether to apply the tort cap. By ordering the Special Verdict as it did, the 
Court over emphasized the element of recklessness and influenced the jury award. Thus, because 
of the prejudice, it was error for the District Court to order the Special Verdict questions as it did. 
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3. The Court Erred by Not Instructing the Jury on Maintaining a Proper 
Lookout. 
The School District had requested a jury instruction setting out the law as to the duty of a 
driver to keep a proper lookout. Supp. R. 146. See also Vaughn v. Porter, 140 Idaho 470, 473, 
95 P.3d 88, 91 (Ct. App. 2004) (describing duty and case law). That the respective drivers 
(Lopez and Austin) were not keeping proper lookouts was key to the School District's defense 
and reasonable under the facts, and an instruction of the drivers' duties should have been given 
to the jury. Vanderford Co. v. Knudson, 144 Idaho 547, 555, 165 P.3d 261, 269 (2007). The 
failure to do so was prejudicial to the School District-particularly, as in this case, where 
Plaintiffs were arguing that the sole negligence rested with Mecham, and presented expert 
testimony purporting to relieve Austin and Lopez of a duty of care. That the failure to correctly 
instruct the jury had an actual impact on the jury's decision is evident from the fact that neither 
driver was allocated any fault for the collision. For this reason, and the others set out above, this 
Court should set aside the verdict and order a new trial. 
E. THE COURT ERRED BY NOT GRANTING THE MOTION FOR JUDGMENT 
NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT. 
In deciding a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the court cannot weigh 
the evidence or pass on the credibility of witnesses, but must determine whether reasonable 
minds could have reached the same conclusion as the jury. Mosel[ Equities, LLC v. Berryhill & 
Co., Inc., 154 Idaho 269, 275, 297 PJd 232, 238 (2013). "In making the motion, the defendants 
necessarily admit[] the truth of all of the plaintiffs' evidence and every legitimate inference that 
could be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Quick v. Crane, 111 Idaho 
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759, 763, 727 P.2d 1187, 1191 (1986). "Whether that evidence is sufficient to create an issue of 
fact is purely a question of law." Id. The evidence supporting the jury's verdict may be 
contradicted, but the verdict will be upheld if it is of such sufficient quantity and probative value 
that reasonable minds could conclude that the verdict of the jury was proper. Mackay, supra, 151 
Idaho at 391; Hurtado v. Land O'Lakes, Inc., 153 Idaho 13, 17,278 P.3d 415,419 (2012). 
1. Evidence from the Plaintiffs' Case in Chief. 
The relevant evidence from the Plaintiffs' case in chief is set forth in the Statement of 
Facts and in Section B, supra, pertaining to the Motion for Directed Verdict. In addition, 
plaintiffs introduced testimony from Robert Laumann, an accident reconstructionist. Because 
accurate measurements had not been made of the crash scene, Mr. Laumann was unable to 
determine the speed of the vehicles. Tr. 531, LI. 16-20; Tr. 534, LI. 10-14. However, he thought 
Lopez was traveling about 45 mph at the moment of impact. Tr. 535, L. 20 -Tr. 536, L. 9. He 
opined that it was dangerous to execute a 3-point tum in bad weather, Tr. 537, LI. 16-17. 
2. Remaining Evidence Presented at Trial. 
Blaine County School District initially presented evidence from Jodi Olsen, an EMT that 
responded to the subject accident. See generally Tr. 781-83. Olsen reported that they were 
warned by another ambulance driver that as the roads approaching the junction Highways 20 and 
75 were slicker than what they appeared to be. Tr. 785, LI. 6-13. Visibility was good, and they 
could see the emergency lights from the junction. Tr. 785, LI. 17-23. The road at the accident 
scene was icy and slick. Tr. 786, LI. 4-17. 
Because Olsen also worked for the School District, and knew Mares, she remained with 
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Mares through her extraction from the car and accompanied her to the hospital in Twin Falls. See 
generally Tr. 787-790. In the immediate aftermath of the collision, Mares described the accident: 
And I said and what do you remember of this accident. And she said, well, I 
remember that we had gone through the intersection and that we were going to 
tum around, and that we had to go farther up the road from where they normally 
turned around. And when we found a wide place, then we were told to tum 
around in the road, and if we could not finish it-if Austin could not finish the 
tum, to back up in his own lane and finish it like a three-point tum. 
Tr. 790, LI. 14-23. Mares told Olsen that she saw the headlights just prior to the collision, and 
that the driver's education vehicle had turned into its lane. Tr. 791, LI. 7-23. Olsen also made a 
written statement, wherein she indicated that Mares had told her that "the Driver's Ed car was 
just finishing a 3-point tum and they were getting ready to return to Carey in the eastbound lane. 
She remembers seeing a car coming at them and screaming." Tr. 793, LI. 14-17. 
The jury also heard from Hugh Derham, who came upon the scene immediately after the 
accident. Tr. 823, LI. 19-23. He was the first person to come upon the accident. Tr. 830, LI. 5-
12. Derham had driven south on Highway 75 from Ketchum, and then turned onto Highway 20. 
See generally Tr. 824-25. He testified that the roads were clear, and there were only occasional 
patches of ice on Highway 75, heading south, but it began to get slippery as he approached the 
junction. Tr. 824, L. 19 -Tr. 825, L. 11. Nevertheless, he was able to safely bring his vehicle to 
a stop without losing traction. Tr. 839, LI. 9-15. From the junction, he could see the taillights of 
Lopez's vehicle immediately prior to the accident, including when Lopez applied his brakes. Tr. 
825, L. 21 -Tr. 826, L. 12. Next on the scene was Officer Ornelas. Tr. 831, LI. 1-21. See also 
Statement of Facts (setting out his testimony). 
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Lopez's deposition transcript was published and portions read into the record. See Tr. 
844 et seq. According to Lopez, he left Carey heading to Fairfield at around 7:00 a.m. Tr. 848, 
LI. 7-11. In Carey, he remembers some black ice on the road, but there was less snow on the 
road as he continued toward Fairfield because the snow plow had already gone through. Tr. 848, 
LI. 15-25. Lopez remembered stopping at the light at the junction of Highways 75 and 20. Tr. 
849, LI. 3-4. He did not see any cars heading the same direction as him-i.e., west along 
Highway 20-nor was there anyone behind him. Tr. 849, LI. 8-11; Tr. 852, LI. 18-23. There 
was no fog-it was clear. Tr. 850, LI. 4-9. He had his headlights on. Tr. 850, LI. 17-19. 
Lopez testified that he saw the auto prior to the collision-it was stopped on the side of 
the road. Tr. 851, LI. 3-6. Lopez testified that the auto pulled in front of him from that position. 
Tr. 851, LI. 6-7. Lopez attempted to steer to avoid the collision. Tr. 851, L. 24 -Tr. 852, L. 1. 
Lopez estimated that the auto was 30 to 40 meters (i.e., 98 to 131 feet) away when he 
first saw it. Tr. 851, LI. 8-11. Lopez thought he was driving about 50 mph at the time. Tr. 851, 
LI. 12-16. He did not think the road conditions were bad because the snow plow had already 
come through and laid down gravel. Tr. 851, LI. 17-22. In fact, he encountered the snow plow at 
the junction-the snow plow was headed toward Carey. Tr. 853, LI. 10-24. 
Mecham also testified. See Tr. 888, et seq. He noted that the State curriculum required 
the teaching and practice of different turns, including 3-point turns. Tr. 902, LI. 9-11. He 
testified that it is difficult to draw up route plans in a rural area because of the lack of streets and 
signage. Tr. 906, LI. 20 -Tr. 907, L. 5. Mecham taught the class per the materials set out in the 
Idaho State Driver's Manual. Tr. 904, LI. 13-20; Tr. 908, LI. 5-9. Class and drive times were in 
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accordance with the students' school and activities schedules. Tr. 911, LI. 8-21. Mecham would 
discuss materials, including turns, in class before practicing in a car-even demonstrating with 
toy cars and sketches of streets and lanes. Tr. 913 - Tr. 915. Prior to the accident, Austin had 
practiced a 3-point turn in the auto. Tr. 916, LI. 3-8; Tr. 953, LI. 8-18. See also Tr. 924, Ll. 7-
25 (describing how a 3-point turn was conducted); Tr. 954 - Tr. 957 (same). This involved 
checking the position of the vehicle, and for other traffic. Tr. 928, L. 13 -Tr. 929, L. 9. 
Because of head injuries, Mecham's memory of the events of the morning of the accident 
1s extremely limited. He remembered getting into the car at the school in Carey, and he 
remembered "looking over through the driver's passenger-or side window and seeing the two 
lights, and that's it." Tr. 920, L. 5 - Tr. 921, L. 3. His intent, on the morning of the accident, 
was to have the students drive to the highway junction, go through the blinking light, and turn 
around at the highway department gravel shed. Tr. 922, LI. 3-7. Mecham testified that he would 
not have knowingly and intentionally subjected Austin or Mares or himself to an unreasonable 
risk of harm or known something like the accident would have occurred where it did. Tr. 926, 
LI. 16-24. He disagreed with the assertion of Plaintiffs counsel that it was inappropriate to 
practice a 3-point turn on a high speed road. Tr. 966, LI. 4-7. He denied knowing of driveways 
on the particular stretch of Highway 20. Tr. 969, LI. 9-11. Mecham was trained that if conditions 
worsened during a drive, it may be more reasonable to turn around than proceed with the 
training. Tr. 678, Ll. 21-25. The volume of traffic on Highway 20 would not have been very 
high at the time of the accident. Tr. 976, LI. 1-4. 
Jamie Maddux, an accident reconstructionist, also testified. Tr. 980, et seq. Based on his 
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investigation and calculations, Maddux determined that the auto had been traveling westbound 
on Highway 20, pulled off to the right shoulder of the road, and was struck while engaging in a 
turnaround maneuver by Lopez's vehicle, which was also traveling westbound. Tr. 1005, L. 23 -
Tr. 1006, L. 5. Based on the positioning of the vehicles, and testimony, Maddux concluded that 
the auto was in the final or third-phase of a 3-point turn. Tr. 1013, LI. 3-7. Based on physical 
evidence at the scene, both vehicles were roughly 90% within the eastbound lane-that is, Lopez 
had crossed over the center line prior to the collision. Tr. 1020, L. 16 - Tr. 1021, L. 3. At the 
time of impact, the auto was traveling at 2 mph, and Lopez was traveling between 43 and 48 
miles per hour. Tr. 1021, LI. 11-13. Maddux concluded that Lopez was driving too fast for 
conditions, which was a contributing factor to the collision, and that Lopez had sufficient time to 
see the lights and/or reflectors on the other vehicle in order to safely come to a stop prior to the 
collision. Tr. 1025, LI. 12-24. See also Tr. 1031, LI. 6-9 (Lopez was the primary contributing 
factor to the accident); Tr. 1062, LI. 1-11 (marker lights and reflectors would have been visible 
to Lopez). He also acknowledged that the auto, making a turn where it did, contributed to the 
collision because, otherwise, there would not have been a collision. Tr. 1030, LI. 23-25. 
Lopez presented evidence from David Beaufort, an accident reconstructionist. See Tr. 
1073 et seq. Beaufort examined the accident scene approximately one and a half years after the 
accident. Tr. 1087, LI. 17-22. A new overlay had been placed on the road, and he was not able to 
examine the vehicles. Tr. 1087, L. 23 - Tr. 1088, LI. 13. Beaufort agreed that that the auto was 
in the final stage of a three-point turn and travelling about 5 mph. Tr. 1080, LI. 1-13. He agreed 
that Lopez's speed was a contributing factor to the collision. Tr. 1101, LI. 11-14. 
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Finally, over the objections of the School District, the Plaintiffs called Joellen Gill, a 
human factors expert, to testify as a rebuttal witness. See Tr. 1113, et seq. Although she 
conducted her test in a different location, Gill believed that the visibility of Lopez's vehicle 
would have been excellent. Tr. 1123, LI. 4-14. Gill also checked for obstructions that would 
have blocked Austin or Mecham's view of Lopez's headlights, and could find nothing. Tr. 1128, 
LI. 4-8. However, Gill did not locate her test vehicle on the road. Tr. 1126, LI. 7-13. She did not 
look to see if the headlights lit up the field to the south of where the test car was parked. Tr. 
1127, LI. 16-20. She believed, erroneously, that Mecham had not taught Austin about making a 
three-point turn. Tr. 1134, LI. 7-10. The gist of her testimony was that Austin would have 
attempted to turn the vehicle based on Mecham's instruction to make a turn, without following 
any of the required steps to check for traffic that had been taught in the class or any other 
concerns for safety or self-preservation. See generally, Tr. 1150, L. 21 -Tr. 1151, L. 5. 
3. There Was Insufficient Evidence to Support a Verdict of Recklessness. 
Recklessness "could be regarded as the type of conduct engaged in by the driver when he 
actually perceives the danger and continues his course of conduct." Hayslip v. George, supra, 92 
Idaho at 353. See also Carrillo, 152 Idaho at 751; Hodge, 91 Idaho at 134. This is not knowledge 
of a theoretical or possible danger, but a manifest and ostensible danger. Hunter, 138 Idaho at 
49; Harris 123 Idaho at 299. 
No facts show that Mecham knew of the approach of Lopez's vehicle. Mares did not see 
Lopez's vehicle until it was right on top of them-approximately 40 feet away. Mares related the 
conversation in the car between Austin and Mecham, which was devoid of verbal warnings, cries 
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of alarm, or anything similar prior to the collision. Mecham's head injuries prevented him from 
any clear memories of the accident. He thought he remembered seeing lights through the driver's 
side window, but had no memory of seeing lights earlier. Although there was testimony 
concerning the visibility at the time of the collision, there was no testimony concerning 
Mecham's "knowledge of the serious danger to others involved in it or with knowledge of facts 
which would disclose this danger to any reasonable man." Carrillo, 152 Idaho at 751. The facts 
presented at trial do not support a conclusion that Mecham had such knowledge, that he "actually 
perceive[ d] the danger and continue[d] his course of conduct." Hayslip, 92 Idaho at 353. 
Even applying the instruction given by the District Court, the facts were insufficient to 
find recklessness. The instruction on "willful or reckless misconduct" required the jury to find: 
... the actor knew or should have known that the actions not only created an 
unreasonable risk of harm to another, but involved a high degree of probability 
that such harm would actually result. 
Supp. R. 218 (underline added). There was no evidence that there was "a high degree of 
probability that such harm would actually result." The witnesses at the scene uniformly agreed 
that there was little or no traffic and that the visibility of lights from other vehicles was excellent. 
It was not illegal to conduct a 3-point turn. There was no evidence of a greater frequency of 
accidents generally, or due to 3-point turns particularly, on the stretch of highway where the 
accident occurred. None of the experts testified that it was highly probable, or even more likely 
than not, that attempting a 3-point tum would result in a collision. 
The evidence only showed a failure to maintain a proper lookout. Mecham did not 
deliberately intend that Austin tum in front of an approaching vehicle. There is no evidence that 
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Mecham knew of Lopez's vehicle in time to prevent the collision. There was no evidence that 
there is a high probability of a collision occurring in attempting a three-point tum. Consequently, 
the facts do not support the jury's finding of recklessness. The jury's verdict on recklessness 
should be set aside, and judgment entered for the School District on that point. 
F. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY NOT GRANTING THE MOTION FOR A 
NEW TRIAL BECAUSE OF AN EXCESSIVE VERDICT. 
Rule 59 provides for a new trial when a jury has awarded excessive damages "appearing 
to have been given under the influence of passion or prejudice." I.R.C.P. 59(a)(S). In ruling, 
"[t]he trial court must weigh the evidence and then compare the jury's award to what the court 
would have given had there been no jury. The verdict should not stand if the disparity is so great 
that it appears to the trial court that the award was given under the influence of passion or 
prejudice." Myers v. Workmen's Auto Ins. Co., 140 Idaho 495, 95 P.3d 977 (2004). "It need not 
be proven that there was in fact passion or prejudice nor is it necessary to point to such in the 
record. The appearance of such is sufficient." Wilson v. J.R. Simplot Co., 143 Idaho 730, 732, 
152 P.3d 601, 603 (2007) (quoting Dinneen v. Finch, 100 Idaho 620, 625-26, 603 P.2d 575, 
580-81 (1979)). The trial court has broad discretion in determining a motion for a new trial. 
Quick v. Crane, supra, 111 Idaho at 766. 
1. The Court Refused to Weigh the Evidence or Make the Requisite 
Comparison. 
The trial court was aware that it was required to weight the evidence and compare what it 
would award against the jury verdict. Tr. 1297, LI. 11-23. Nevertheless, the District Court 
refused to do so, explaining: 
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Here the jury weighed what it considered a human life was worth. I think they did 
no more and no less than what they were asked to do. If I overrode the jury's 
decision, the plaintiff might as well have had a Court trial. 
Tr. 1297, L. 24 - Tr. 1298, L. 4. See also Tr. 1299, L. 2 - Tr. 1300, LI. 5 (further indicating 
that it was improper for the court to evaluate the jury award). Since the court refused to perform 
the analysis required under Rule 59(a)(5), the court erred in denying the motion for new trial. 
2. The Verdict Shows that the Jury Acted Out of Passion and Prejudice. 
The jury awarded $7,473.40 in economic damages and a total of $3,500,000 in non-
economic damages. The jury allocated the entire fault for the accident to Mecham, even though it 
was uncontradicted that Lopez's speed had contributed to the accident, and that Austin had a 
clear legal duty as a driver to maintain a lookout. 
Lopez thought he was driving about 50 mph at the time. Tr. 851, LI. 12-16. Maddux 
determined that Lopez had crossed over the center line prior to the collision, and was travelling 
between 43 and 48 mph at the time of the collision. Tr. 1020, L. 16-Tr. 1021, L. 3; Tr. 1021, 
LI. 11-13. There was evidence that Lopez had attempted to brake which obviously had no 
appreciative influence on Lopez's speed. Thus, Maddux concluded that Lopez was driving too 
fast for conditions, which was a contributing factor to the collision. He also testified that Lopez 
had sufficient time to see the lights and/or reflectors on the other vehicle in order to safely come 
to a stop prior to the collision. Tr. 1025, LI. 12-24. See also Tr. 1031, LI. 6-9 (Lopez was the 
primary contributing factor to the accident); Tr. 1062, LI. 1-11 (marker lights and reflectors 
would have been visible to Lopez). David Beaufort, Lopez's own expert, agreed that Lopez's 
speed was a contributing factor to the collision. Tr. 1101, LI. 11-14. 
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There is no question but that Austin was driving the auto at the time of the accident. The 
jury had been instructed: 
All drivers, including a minor operating a motor vehicle on a public highway, are 
charged with the same standard of conduct as an adult. A person learning to 
operate a motor vehicle under the tutelage of another is liable for injuries resulting 
from his own negligence in the operation of such vehicle. 
Supp. R. 213. The evidence showed that Austin had at least two years of experience regularly 
driving motor vehicles in and around his parent's farm. 
The jury, as fact finder, can allocate fault. However, that the jury allocated all fault to 
Mecham and none to either of the drivers is a clear indication of the jury's prejudice against 
Mecham. Even the judge acknowledged that "the verdict reflects to some degree the jury's 
distaste for the degree of negligence involved in Austin's death." Tr. 1299, LI. 2-4. 
It is also clear from Plaintiffs' closing arguments that Plaintiffs appealed to the emotions, 
passions and prejudices of the jury through the use of inflammatory tactics. For instance, 
Plaintiffs' argued that Mecham violated Idaho law by not keeping more specific records of the 
student drives. Supp. Tr. (Israel) 19. However, there is no such law. See I.C. § 33-1701 et seq. 
Plaintiffs' argued that by investigating the accident and presenting a defense, the School 
District was not accepting responsibility for the accident, but was devaluing life.3 Supp. Tr. 
(Israel) 28-29. However, the purposes of the ITCA's notice requirements is to allow the 
governmental entity to conduct a full investigation into the cause of the injury in order to 
3 This, even though the School District had paid the Hennefer's funeral expenses. See R. 267-68. 
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determine the extent of liability, if any, and of allowing it to prepare defenses. Friel v. Boise City 
Housing Authority, 126 Idaho 484, 486, 887 P .2d 29, 31 (1994). Thus, again, Plaintiffs 
presented an argument contrary to Idaho law, simply for the purpose of inflaming the jury. 
Plaintiffs' closing argument also misstated and misrepresented the facts and law.4 
Plaintiffs argued that Mecham was reckless because he did not have a route plan. Supp. Tr. 
(Israel) 32, LI. 12-15. However, Jones testified that the use of route plans was introduced as part 
of the State curriculum to improve the efficiency of the teaching. See generally Tr. 630-31. 
There is nothing in Jones' testimony to indicate that route plans were included for safety reasons, 
nor is there anything in the record that indicated that failure to use a route plan "involved a high 
degree of probability that such harm would actually result." 
Plaintiffs argued that Mecham had to have known about rush hour traffic and "that it was 
likely a car would come." Supp. Tr. (Israel) 34, LI. 18-21. This was false. All of the testimony 
indicated that there was very little traffic at the time of the collision. 
Plaintiffs told the jury that Austin only had three hours of driving experience. Supp. Tr. 
(Israel) 30, LI. 9-10. However, the testimony from Austin's parents indicated that Austin owned 
a motorcycle, and daily drove the motorcycle and other vehicles for at least two years prior to the 
accident. Tr. 302, L. 15 - Tr. 303, L. 4; Tr. 321, LI. 12-24; Tr. 344, LI. 17 -Tr. 345, L. 1; Tr. 
752, LI. 15-19; Tr. 753, L. 23 -Tr. 754, L. 5; Tr. 345, LI. 12-15. 
Plaintiffs argued that Mecham testified to seeing the headlights out the rear window of 
4 The closing arguments are located in the Supplemental Reporter's Transcript on Appeal prepared by 
Susan P. Israel (hereinafter, "Supp. Tr. (Israel)"). 
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the driver's education vehicle. Supp. Tr. (Israel) 35, LI. 15-23. This is also false. Mecham 
testified that he remembered "looking over through the driver's passenger-or side window and 
seeing the two lights, and that's it." Tr. 920, L. 5 - Tr. 921, L. 3. In other words, the only 
evidence is that, like Mares, Mecham only saw Lopez's lights immediately prior to the impact. 
Plaintiffs misstated the evidence for the purpose of prejudicing and inflaming the jury. 
Plaintiffs introduced new evidence via their closing argument and/or encouraged the jury 
to consult evidence that was not admitted. Plaintiffs concluding remarks asked for $2.5 million 
for each parent in damages based on research done by the Plaintiffs' counsel of government 
studies. Supp. Tr. (Israel) 48, L. 17 - Supp. Tr. (Israel) 49, L. 2. Even after an objection was 
made and upheld, Plaintiffs' counsel suggested to the jury that "[ s Jome of you might be aware of 
those studies." Supp. Tr. (Israel) 49, L. 8. However, such research was not part of the evidence. 
Plaintiffs told the jury to calculate "what a 15-year-old's life was worth to parents like 
that." Supp. Tr. (Israel) 48, LI. 7-8. That is not the correct measure of damages, which is 
limited to loss of financial support, services, comfort and society, and specifically excluding 
damages for grief or sorrow. See Supp. Tr. 220 (Jury Instruction No. 22). 
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, Plaintiffs told the jury that the inclusion of a jury 
instruction on recklessness was a comment on the evidence by the judge. Plaintiffs' counsel 
stated: "We contend the School District was reckless because it was, and the Judge has instructed 
you on reckless because he thinks the facts support it." Supp. Tr. (Israel) 90, LI. 4-7. "Remarks 
or comments by a trial judge which would tend to prejudice either of the parties to a jury trial are 
proscribed because of the great possibility that such an expression will influence the jurors." 
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State v. White, 97 Idaho 708, 711, 551 P.2d 1344, 1347 (1976). Thus, it was highly prejudicial 
and inflammatory to tell the jury that the judge believed that Mecham had acted recklessly. 
In sum, Plaintiffs obtained a verdict that was the result of passion and prejudice, which 
verdict should be set aside and a new trial ordered. 
3. The Verdict Incorporated a Punitive Element. 
The Idaho legislature has set a reasonable value on non-economic damages in personal 
injury actions, which applies unless the plaintiff is able to show willful or reckless misconduct on 
the part of the defendant. I.C. § 6-1603(4)(a). Similarly, punitive damages may be awarded 
based on the culpability of the defendant. Seiniger Law Office, P.A. v. North Pacific Ins. Co., 
145 Idaho 241, 250, 178 P .3d 606, 615 (2007). This Court has expressly held that recklessness or 
reckless misconduct supports a claim for punitive damages, and equated it to wantonness. See 
Vendelin v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 140 Idaho 416, 427-28, 95 P.3d 34, 45-46 (2004); Myers v. 
Workmen's Auto Ins. Co., 140 Idaho 495, 510, 95 P.3d 977, 992 (2004); Hall v. Farmers 
Alliance klut. Ins. Co., 145 Idaho 313, 321 and 325, 179 P.3d 276,284 and 288 (2008). 
Thus, in order to lift the cap on non-economic damages, the jury must find mental 
culpability-a bad act coupled with a bad mind-sufficient to support an award of punitive 
damages. Removing the cap means that damages can be limitlessly expanded based on 
culpability, and is tantamount to an award based on the defendant's behavior. However, Idaho 
Code § 6-918 provides that "[g]overnrnental entities and their employees shall not be liable for 
punitive damages on any claim allowed under the provisions of this act." Because of the risk that 
a verdict in excess of the cap would represent exemplary damages based on the conduct of the 
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defendant, § 6-918 bars lifting the non-economic damages cap when a government employee 
commits a tort while acting within the course and scope of his or her employment. 
In this case, Instruction No. 8 informed the jury that Mecham was acting within the 
course and scope of his employment. Supp. R. 206. There is no dispute on that fact. 
Accordingly, the District Court should have applied the non-economic damages cap. 
It is clear that the jury's award was intended to be punitive. The District Court 
acknowledged that "the verdict reflects to some degree the jury's distaste for the degree of 
negligence involved in Austin's death." Tr. 1299, LI. 2-4. Plaintiffs' closing argument lambasted 
the District for investigating the accident and hiring legal counsel rather than offering an 
apology. Supp. Tr. (Israel) 28-29. Plaintiffs argued that Mecham was unsupportive, did not 
perform his job, and did not take is seriously. Supp. Tr. (Israel) 32 and 36. Counsel stated that 
Mrs. Hennefer, who works for the school district, "has to go to work every day knowing that 
they're against her. They're against her son." Supp. Tr. (Israel) 46, LI. 9-11. He also argued 
that "if we let Mecham off the hook, that's basically telling your community that we don't value 
good educators, that anything will go." Supp. Tr. (Israel) 91, LI. 7-10. 
Total economic damages claimed were only $7,473.40. The non-economic damage cap at 
the time of trial was $305,000.00. Yet the jury awarded Mrs. Hennefer over 5 times the cap; and 
awarded Mr. Hennefer an amount nearly 4 times the cap. Given the size of the award, the 
comments of Plaintiffs' counsel, and the conclusion of the trial judge, it is clear that there was an 
improper punitive motive in the jury's award. The Court should impose the non-economic 
damages cap or, at a minimum, order a new trial. 
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G. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY NOT GRANTING THE MOTION FOR A 
NEW TRIAL BECAUSE OF INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE AND/OR AN 
ERROR IN LAW. 
Rule 59 provides for a new trial when there was in insufficiency of the evidence to justify 
the verdict, or that it is against the law, or there was an error in law occurring at trial. I.R.C.P. 
59(a)(6) and (7). "It is well established that the trial judge may grant a new trial based on 
I.R.C.P. Rule 59(a)(6) where, after he has weighed all of the evidence, including his own 
determination of the credibility of the witnesses, he concludes that the verdict is not in accord 
with his assessment of the clear weight of the evidence." Quick v. Crane, supra, 111 Idaho at 
766. There is no requirement that the trial court view the evidence in a light most favorable to the 
verdict-winner. Id., 111 Idaho at 767. 
In its ruling on the Motion for New Trial, the District Court applied the wrong standard, 
rejected any requirement for knowledge or foreseeability in order to find recklessness. Tr. 1287, 
LI. 3-12. Instead, the District Court reasoned: 
So, in my view, there doesn't have to be any evidence of knowledge of whether 
there's a car corning. The essence of the recklessness to me was that he was 
instructed during the driver's training instruction for the teachers when and where 
and how you do a three-point turn, and that was violated in this case. 
Tr. 1287, LI. 13-18. The District Court ignored the knowledge and foreseeability elements. It 
failed to consider or discuss the requirement for showing a high probability of the type of harm. 
Instead, the District Court incorrectly accepted a form of negligence per se based on a text book 
as sufficient to establish recklessness. This is, at most, negligence. It lacks the mental state of 
mind and knowledge required for recklessness. The District Court should have ordered a new 
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trial but did not. This Court should rectify this error and order a new trial. 
H. THE COURT ERRED BY ALLOWING JOELLEN GILL TO TESTIFY. 
Expert testimony must assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a 
fact in issue. I.R.E. 702. Expert opinion that is speculative, conclusory, or unsubstantiated by 
facts in the record is of no assistance to the jury in rendering its verdict and, thus, inadmissible. 
Coombs v. Curnow, 148 Idaho 129, 140, 219 P.3d 453, 464 (2009). Testimony is speculative 
when it theorizes about a matter for which the evidence is not sufficient for certain knowledge. 
Id. "Where the normal experience and qualifications of lay jurors permit them to draw proper 
conclusions from given facts and circumstances, then expert conclusions or opinions are 
inadmissible." Rockefeller v. Grabow, 136 Idaho 637,647, 39 P.3d 577, 587 (2001). 
Gill was not an accident reconstruction expert. Tr. 1107, LI. 16-19. The primary purpose 
of Gill's testimony was to demonstrate Austin's state of mind. See Tr. 1110, L. 21 - Tr. 1111, 
L. 2. Gill's testified as to what she believed that Lopez could see, even though she positioned the 
test vehicle in a different location, and made no attempt to identify if there was illumination by 
the headlights. Tr. 1126, L. 3 - Tr. 1127, L. 20. She testified that Lopez would have believed 
the auto to have been off the road. Tr. 1129, LI. 2-12; Tr. 1131, LI. 17-19. Later, Gill testified 
that "even if [Austin] believed and knew that a three-point tum in this location was something 
that he shouldn't do because it was hazardous, he's not going to question the authority of his 
driver's training instructor." Tr. 1150, LI. 21-25. 
There are several problems with Gill's testimony. First, it was not true rebuttal testimony. 
Other experts testified as to how far lights could be seen, or how far headlights would project, 
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but none testified as to how Lopez would have interpreted what he saw, or whether Austin would 
have unquestionably done anything Mecham told him. Instead, Gill introduced new evidence. 
Second, Lopez was available to testify about what he thought he saw or why he reacted 
as he did. Similarly, other students, including Mares, could testify whether he or she felt 
compelled to do whatever Mecham asked, even if there was a known and imminent danger. 
Offering Gill's testimony at the end of the case prohibited the Defense from addressing it, and 
was unnecessary because of other, less speculative sources. 
Third, Gill's testimony was speculative. She did not merely testify as to how a certain 
number of people acted in a study, or how an "average" or "typical" person might act, but 
testified specifically about Lopez's and Austin's state of mind, perceptions, and mental 
processes. She had no evidence to suggest she knew what Lopez or Austin was thinking. 
Fourth, the jurors' experience and knowledge would have let them draw the necessary 
conclusions from the evidence as to what Lopez saw or should have seen, or whether Austin 
would make a tum without any concern for his own safety and contrary to all safety instructions. 
See Warren v. Sharp, 139 Idaho 599, 606, 83 P.3d 773, 780 (2003) (overruled on other grounds, 
Blizzard v. Lundeby, 156 Idaho 204, 322 P.3d 286 (2014)) (holding that expert testimony on 
whether a driver could have avoided an accident should not have been admitted). 
Finally, her testimony concerning Austin did not relate to causation, or whether Austin 
kept a proper lookout, but that he could not be held accountable for any such breach-to relieve 
him of a duty. The existence of a duty of care is a question of law. Jones v. Starnes, 150 Idaho 
257, 260, 245 P.3d 1009, 1012 (2011). As such, Gill's testimony invaded the province of the 
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court, and directly contradictory to Idaho law on the duty of drivers to safely operate a vehicle. 
I. COSTS. 
The District Court awarded costs to the Plaintiffs under Rule 54( d), holding that the 
Plaintiffs were the prevailing party. Because the School District is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law and/or a new trial, the award of costs to the Plaintiffs should be set aside. 
Appellants assert that they be awarded costs of appeal as a matter of right should they be 
found to be the prevailing party. I.A.R. 40. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, the Court should find that the School District is entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law as to the issue of recklessness, and order a new trial. 
trr 
DATED this Lday of July, 2014. 
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